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Abstract 
 
This paper is about the regulation of private sector participation (PSP) in public water utilities. Using case 
studies from Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom, it identifies and discusses the regulatory 
mechanisms that have been introduced and the issues surrounding information access, price and service 
quality regulation. The paper also analyses what measures have been implemented in these three cases in 
order to achieve regulatory accountability, independence and an adequate level of financial and human 
resources.  
 
The method adopted was case survey including the analysis of official regulatory documents and other 
relevant material and validation by an expert panel. It investigates the conditions that are necessary for 
regulatory mechanisms to be implemented and operated effectively in each context, and draws out some 
general conclusions for areas of improvement.  
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Introduction  
 
In 1999, the United Nations observed that whereas in 1950 thirty per cent (30%) of the world’s 
population lived in urban areas, by 2000 the proportion of urban dwellers would have risen to 47 per cent. 
The world’s urban population is expected to reach 60 per cent by 2030. Most of these new urbanites live 
in low-income settlements that lack access to basic services such as a water supply and sanitation. In 
2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 1.1 billion people lacked assess to potable 
water and 2.4 billion lacked accesses to basic sanitation (WHO, 2000). It is estimated (unpublished 
professional estimates) that capital expenditure of around $800 billion is needed in order to respond to 
water need around the world. It is envisaged that bulk of this needed capital will be privately financed.  
 
Under appropriate regulatory conditions, the introduction of private sector participation (PSP) can provide 
water utilities with greater management expertise, a greater ability to attract investment and a greater 
ability to reduce operation and maintenance costs. It is possible for a PSP arrangement to provide a 
quality of service that public water utilities have not been able to deliver or sustain. However, while on 
the one hand PSP can bring benefits to the operation of water utilities, it is also true that a rushed 
introduction of PSP, without a well-established regulatory system, can have negative impacts on a water 
utility’s efficiency. Such a rushed introduction is strongly discouraged by major donor agencies such as 
the World Bank (Delmon, 2001 and GWR, 1999). 
 
Private Sector Participation (PSP) in water utilities can take many forms, including service, concession, 
lease, management, BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) contracts, and semi or full divestiture. The best form 
to introduce depends on factors such as the socio-economic and political characteristics of the country in 
question. 
 
This paper analyses the regulatory systems used in water utilities in three different countries in the 
context of water utilities. It investigates the conditions that are necessary for regulatory mechanisms to be 
implemented and operated effectively in each context, and draws out some general conclusions. The case 
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studies were chosen to represent countries at different stages of economic development so as to compare 
the reality of PSP regulation in developing and developed countries. 
 
The authors based their findings on a review of the published literature and case materials, including 
unpublished, official documents (for example, concession contracts, regulatory frameworks, etc.), which 
were then validated by interviewing a panel of international experts. Communication with the panel was 
by email and telephone calls. The authors developed a checklist to guide but not restrict this 
communication. Through these discussions, they identified the points of convergence and divergence 
from the case studies. In most cases the experts agreed to give their personal, professional opinion rather 
than their organization’s viewpoint and requested anonymity. Hence their credentials cannot be 
published. The authors selected the panel members through their reputation in the field and their 
published work on the topic. At the time of the interviews, all the panel members had several years’ 
relevant experience of direct or indirect involvement in the regulation of large public-private partnerships 
(PPPs). The panel members included people from the Caribbean and Latin America as well as operators, 
regulators, dispute jurors, consultants, people from multilateral donor agencies and academics. 
 
Policy towards disclosure of information in regulatory offices varies between countries, but there is a 
general lack of information relating to conditions of contract, the basis for tariff setting, investment, and 
to business plans and financing agreements. The authors decided to study Buenos Aires in Argentina, 
Chile and England and Wales based on factors such as the maturity of contracts, the variety of 
mechanisms used, the variety of socio-economic and political contexts and the resources that were 
available to conduct the research. 
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Case 1. Buenos Aires, Argentina 
 
Background 
Argentina is located in South America, and borders Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. It is the 
second largest country in South America and is administratively divided into 23 provinces and one federal 
district. The capital, Buenos Aires, is on the East Coast. According to the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP, 2001), the population of Argentina in 1999 was around 36.6 million, of which 9 per 
cent had access to improved water resources.  
 
Governments and local governments normally introduce PSP when the water sector is in crisis and there 
is a need to solve financial and managerial problems. According to regulatory agency, Ente Partidario de 
Obras y Servicios Sanitarios (ETOSS), the main reasons the Argentinean government decided to 
introduce PSP in Buenos Aires was to attract the investment necessary to improve the quality of services 
provided by water utilities and to allow the expansion of utility coverage in order to satisfy an increasing 
demand (Alcázar and Brook-Cowen, 1996 and ETOSS, 2001c).  
 
At beginning of the concession contract, an estimated 5.5 million people in the regulated area (65 per cent 
of the population) were connected to the water supply system and 4.6 million (54 per cent of the 
population) to the sewerage system. By 2001, some 7.8 million (82 per cent of the population) were 
connected to water supplies and 5.8 million to sewerage systems by the private water consortium, Aguas 
Argentinas . 
 
The public water utility, Obras Sanitarias de la Nación (OSN), despite having qualified and experienced 
staff, was seriously under funded and in some areas over-politicized, with the political appointment of 
OSN managers, for example. This resulted in the utility’s overstaffing, a lack of motivation among its 
staff, unjustifiably low tariffs, low cost recovery and a lack of capital investment—all of which were 
hampering the utility’s progress (Alcázar et al., 2000). 
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The Argentinean government decided to solve these problems by privatizing the Buenos Aires water and 
sewerage system through a concession contract. In June 1992, the bidding process began and a private 
water consortium, Aguas Argentinas S.A., formed by a group led by Lyonnaise des Eaux (Table 1), was 
awarded the contract. 
 
The regulatory system was an integral part of the PSP because of the need to ensure that the winning 
operator did not abuse its monopoly position. The system used in this case was regulation by contract 
(Jouravlev 2000), where the majority of rules and regulations were stated in the Concession Contract 
(ETOSS, 2001a) and Regulatory Framework (ETOSS, 2001b), with all the operators inside the regulated 
area following that set of rules. The Argentinian government set up the regulator, ETOSS, to monitor and 
enforce the regulations and gave it responsibility to carry out a multitude of tasks, as presented in Box 1. 
 
Box 1. Main tasks of the regulator, ETOSS 
 
• To assure, through efficient control, that the operator complies with the Concession Contract, the 
Regulatory Framework and Argentinean laws. 
• To approve the customer service code of conduct proposal presented by the operating company. 
• To compile the information necessary for regulatory tasks, such as price and service quality control. 
• To approve the operator’s expansion plans and ensure that the operator complies with the service and 
coverage expansion regulations.  
• To publicize the operator’s expansion plans and any new tariffs. 
• To analyse the annual information provided by the operator. 
• To adjust and review tariffs when needed, ensuring any adjustments fall in line with contractual 
specifications. 
• To ensure that new tariffs are introduced adequately and that the operator complies with the new tariff 
regime. 
• To receive and investigate customer complaints. 
• To act upon any confirmed operator misconduct. 
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• To apply penalties in cases of proven misconduct or breach of contract by the operator. 
• To report to the government if a serious breach of contract regulations occurs. 
 
Source: ETOSS, 2001b 
 
Regulatory mechanisms 
 
There were three main areas around which the regulatory mechanisms were devised—regulation of 
information access, price regulation and service/quality control. 
 
Regulation of information  
 
Regulators need information from operators in a form that enables them to carry out their work. Article 
39 of the Regulatory Framework prescribes that the private operator has to provide the regulator with 
records of the service it has provided, along with information that demonstrates that its actions and 
performance meet the terms stated in the Concession Contract and Regulatory Framework (ETOSS, 
2001b). 
 
Article 40 of the same document attempts to guarantee the information’s quality and accuracy by stating 
that the information provided by the operator must be verified by an independent technical and financial 
consultant chosen by the operator and agreed by the regulator. 
 
Finally, article 41 states that the private operator is responsible for publishing information on the 
minimum quality standards and the quality of services delivered, and for making this information easily 
available to the public. 
 
It can be seen that the Regulatory Framework ensures that the regulator has adequate access to relevant 
information. What is not so certain is if, in practice, the regulator has the financial and technical capacity 
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necessary to collect and interpret that information, and thus to reduce information asymmetries. Several 
experts from the panel suggested that, despite these measures, information asymmetries continue to be a 
problem in the Buenos Aires concession contract.  
 
This view, that the regulator lacks the technical capacity and experience necessary to reduce information 
asymmetries, is endorsed by Alcázar et al. (2000). This author states that ETOSS lacks historical records, 
hence is unable to effectively benchmark performance. In essence, the  regulator did not use the 
mechanisms it had available for information asymmetry reduction effectively.  
 
Price regulation 
 
The regulator’s tariff review system aims to ensure that tariffs reflect the real economic cost of the 
services provided. It also aims to make the relationship between the operating company and customer 
transparent by increasing the information available on tariffs—for example, what the tariffs are made up 
of and how they were derived (ETOSS, 2001a; 2001b). 
 
During the bidding process, the tariff system used the retail price index (RPI-K) formula. In this, a retail 
price index (flat rate) is set depending on the service being delivered (water or water and sewerage) and 
the type of consumers (residential or non-residential). The retail price index is then multiplied by an 
adjustable factor, K, which takes into account the private operator’s forecasted costs and investments. The 
product of the multiplication is then adjusted according to factors such as the size, location, age and 
category (low- to high-budget) of the property. The contract was then awarded to the bidder who, based 
on this formula, offered the greatest tariff reduction. The successful was Aguas Argentinas S.A., who 
offered to reduce water tariffs by 26.9 per cent (K was valued as 0.731) (Alcázar et al., 2000; ETOSS, 
2001c). 
 
The regulatory system provides for tariffs to be revised every five years. The review is the responsibility 
of the regulator (ETOSS) guided by the Concession Contract and Regulatory Framework. Under 
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extraordinary conditions (for example, a fluctuation of ±7 per cent in the operator’s costs, new legislation, 
tax changes, etc.) the review can be undertaken earlier. 
 
The establishment of tariffs that reflect the real costs of providing services depends on an accurate 
valuation and forecast of the operator’s costs and investments. It was extremely difficult for the regulator 
to evaluate and forecast Aguas Argentinas S.A.’s operation costs and investments accurately. This was 
because the relevant information was not available in a suitable form, resulting in information 
asymmetries in the regulatory system (Alcázar et al., 2000; Loftus and McDonald, 2001).  
 
The tariff review process generated debate because of frequent decisions, either taken or approved by the 
regulator, to increase water tariffs and introduce what consumers perceived to be unjustified extra 
charges.  
 
For example, an extraordinary tariff review was triggered in September 1994, just one year after the 
concession, when the operator reported an increase of 7 per cent in its operating costs on the basis of 
bringing forward some of its expansion plans at the request of the government. The government wanted 
immediate provision of services in some of the poorer neighbourhoods. Why such provision was not 
envisaged at the pre-bid stage remains a question, but there is a suspicion that the non-recognition of 
some of the poorer neighbourhoods was a political strategy that in this case turned into a financial liability 
for the private operator and a political liability for the Argentinean government . 
 
Then, in May 1998, five years after the concession began, tariffs were reviewed once more. The regulator 
decided to increase tariffs by 5.31 per cent (ETOSS, 2001b, and Artana et al., 1998). The tariffs were now 
only 12.5 per cent lower than those that had been applied by the public water utility, Obras Sanitarias de 
la Nación (OSN) (ETOSS, 2001a). The former Mayor of Buenos Aires and former President of 
Argentina, Fernando de la Rua, went even further, stating that ‘water rates, which Aguas Argentinas S.A. 
said would be reduced by 27 per cent, have actually raised a total of 20 per cent’ (Anon, 2000). 
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Even if the 1994 tariff increases were explained by the need to rapidly expand service provision, Loftus 
and McDonald (2001) argue that granting the increase so soon after awarding the concession undermines 
the whole reason for using PSP. The private company should have financed its own expansion plans, but 
instead created a situation where there was a danger of the private operator ‘banking the tariff increases 
and earning interest while delaying the cost of extensions for as long as possible’ (ibid.). 
 
The introduction of extra charges to water bills was controversial—the regulator also negotiated these. In 
particular there is a charge called SUMA (Servicio Universal y Medio Ambiente). The SUMA, which 
came into effect in 1998 (Artana et al., 1998; Loftus and McDonald, 2001), was introduced to generate 
capital for environmental clean up operations and network expansion. It was highly contested by many 
and the Buenos Aires consumer watchdog took the operator to court. The courts decided that the SUMA 
charge was not legal, but after an appeal from the Minister for Natural Resources and Human 
Development this initial decision was overturned and the charge was introduced after all. The SUMA 
network expansion works are going more slowly than agreed and the environmental clean up has not 
started (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). 
 
During a public hearing in June 2000 (ETOSS, 2001d) a member of the Argentinean Senate’s 
administrative staff pointed out that in addition to the SUMA charge, further surcharges were being 
applied to tariffs by the private operator. These included a charge to customers called OPCT (Obras por 
Cuenta de Terceros), made to speed up connection to the network. In some cases connections were 
delayed until customers paid the complete OPCT charge. 
 
 
Service quality control 
 
The effectiveness of service quality control will depend on the capacity of the regulator to monitor the 
quality of services in such a way that any unjustified non-compliance can be detected and responded to in 
effective and efficient manner. 
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The Concession Contract and Regulatory Framework provide a set of measures to monitor the quality of 
services delivered to consumers. The two documents describe the standards required in areas such as 
water quality, water pressure and reliability of service. They also require that the operator inform the 
regulator if those standards are not met, provide reasons for non-compliance and take steps to attain the 
agreed minimum service quality standards. The operator also has to provide consumers and the regulator 
with an annual report on the level of service quality it has delivered to consumers in the preceding year 
(ETOSS, 2001a; Regulatory Framework ETOSS, 2001b). 
 
By publishing the service quality report, the operator is giving a clear picture to consumers and the 
regulator of the service consumers are receiving and of future targets the company aims to achieve. In 
case of any unjustified non-compliance, the operator is liable for fines. These fines do not affect any 
ongoing compensation disputes or penalties to be paid to the government or consumers. 
 
The Concession Contract pre-determines the value of fines. These vary, for example, from 5,000 
Argentinean pesos if water supply is cut off for more than 12 hours or for discriminatory behaviour 
towards consumers, to 100,000 pesos if supply is cut off for more than 48 hours, or if consumers are cut 
off from the sewerage network without serious consequences. The income generated from these fines is 
deposited in a Penalty Fund (Fondo Annual de Multas) and distributed to consumers through tariff cuts in 
the subsequent price review. These mechanisms have had a positive effect on some service quality 
standards, such as replying to customer complaints (Alcázar et al., 2000). 
 
Conditions necessary to implement regulatory mechanisms 
 
The regulatory mechanisms that the government chooses should be guided by political, social, economic 
and technical factors. These mechanisms will only work under favourable conditions, which are briefly 
described below. 
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 Regulatory accountability 
 
The regulator should be accountable for its decisions. One way to ensure regulatory accountability is to 
appoint an overseer. In the Buenos Aires water concession, the Treasury Office (Tribunal de Cuentas de 
la Nación) is allowed under articles 84, 85 and 136 of the National Accounting Law (Ley de 
Contabilidade de la Nation) to examine the legality of regulatory decisions and the regulator’s accounts 
(ETOSS, 2001c). This mechanism could be enhanced by the publication of the regulator, ETOSS’s, 
accounts and the methodology/rationale for its decisions. Other measures to ensure regulatory 
accountability include the ability to appeal to both the government and the courts. According to 
Argentinean law (ETOSS, 2001b), both consumers and the operator can appeal to the government or a 
judicial court against any regulatory decision taken by ETOSS. 
 
 
Independence 
 
The independence of the regulator is essential in the case of long-term monopolies such as concessions. 
The water concession, in particular, should be key in making a positive contribution towards the social 
and economic well-being of consumers. In the case of the Buenos Aires water concession, people 
certainly expected an independent regulator. 
 
In Buenos Aires, the level of independence of the regulatory system and the water regulator has been 
criticized in literatrue. Alcázar et al. (2000) concluded that the water regulator was negatively affected by 
successive political interventions into the regulatory process and contract renegotiations. 
 
In the first instance, ETOSS’s directors were political appointees from provincial and municipal 
government and their decisions were reportedly delayed because of ‘partisan disputes’ between the board 
members (Alcázar et al., 2000). In addition, some of ETOSS’s decisions were overturned by the national 
government. During the 1998 tariff review, for example, the operator, Aguas Argentinas S.A., proposed 
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an increase of 11.7 per cent but two of the ETOSS directors strongly disputed this. ETOSS later agreed an 
increase of 1.6 per cent but the government rejected its proposal and instructed a tariff increase of 4.6 per 
cent plus a further increase of 15 per cent between 2001–03, thus undermining the regulator’s decisions 
and severely exposing its limited powers and independence (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). 
 
Consumer perception of lack of independence of the regulator has undermined the credibility of the 
system and public opinion has fallen (Table 2). Table 2 shows that by 1997, 51.9 per cent of people had a 
negative impression of the water concession, while only 18.1 per cent said that the concession had had a 
positive impact. 
 
 
Resources 
 
Regulation does not come free and it is essential that adequate financial and human resources are 
available to the regulatory system so as to permit the regulator to carry out its tasks effectively. The 
system used to finance the water regulator in Buenos Aires involves the regulator retaining a percentage 
of tariffs (2.67 per cent). This avoids direct government funding that could jeopardize regulatory 
independence. Nonetheless, this mechanism could be further strengthened by the publication of the 
regulator, ETOSS’s, accounts and by a periodic review of the regulatory budget so as to discourage over-
budgeting that, in turn, could lead to regulatory opportunism and inefficiency.  
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Case 2. Chile 
 
Background 
 
Chile is located in South America, bordering Argentina, Bolivia and Peru. It has 13 regions. According to 
the WHO (2000), in 2000 Chile had an urban population of around 13 million with water supply coverage 
of 99 per cent and sanitation coverage of 94 per cent. In that same year, the rural population stood at 
around 2 million, of which 66 per cent had access to water supply services and 98 per cent had access to 
sanitation services. 
 
The semi-divestiture of water utility assets—more often known as privatization—although more common 
in developed economies, was adopted in the Chilean water sector. 
 
In 1998, the government of Chile decided to privatize one of its main public water companies, ESVAL. 
The following year it privatized the other, EMOS. The government kept a 35 per cent ownership and 
transferred 40 per cent to the private sector, with 10 per cent going to the employees and the remaining 15 
per cent put on the stock market. Inversiones Aguas Metropolitanas, (a consortium that included Aguas 
Barcelona and Suez Lyonnais) bought 42 per cent of EMOS in 1999 (Urgaz, 1999). The government’s 
vision is to privatize 55 per cent of water utilities, meaning that private water companies will eventually 
service 70 per cent of the population. 
 
The reasons for these privatizations were linked to the utilities’ inefficient allocation of resources and to 
the necessity for increasing these utilities’ efficiency and the service quality they provide (ETOSS, 
2001c). 
 
The Chilean government recognized the importance of regulating the private sector and in 1990 created 
the water and sewerage industry regulator, Superintendencia de Services Sanitarios (SISS) (Chilean Law 
No.18.902, 27 January 1990). A new regulatory system was also created under the new law for water and 
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sanitation services (Ley General de Servicios Sanitario, DFL 382) (SISS, 2001). Under this law the SISS 
had to perform regulatory tasks such as:  
• updating the water regulatory system and introducing amendments to service quality standards;  
• setting and periodically reviewing water tariffs for both the public and private water utilities;  
• investigating customer complaints;  
• monitoring service quality and applying fines when minimum standards were not delivered;  
• informing the public on each of the operators' performances; and 
• monitoring and upgrading the utilities’ development plans, etc. (SISS, 2001). 
 
 
Regulatory mechanisms 
 
The main regulatory mechanisms investigated in this case study covered information access, price and 
service/quality regulation. 
 
Regulation of information  
 
The regulator’s goal was to evaluate service quality by comparing the services delivered in different 
regions of Chile with those in other countries. 
 
According to Chilean law, providing it has proper authorization from a civil court judge, the water 
regulator can demand relevant information from representatives, directors or others persons or institutions 
connected with the private operator. With the information it collects, the regulator is also responsible for 
creating an information database to evaluate each operator’s performance and to allow benchmarking 
(SISS, 2001). However, some of the experts interviewed during the course of this research acknowledged 
that at the time of the interviews there was no adequate database established.  
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The regulator also introduced a system of fines. Each operator can be fined if it denies access to 
information (50 tariff units) or provides inaccurate information (between 51 and 500 tariff units) (SISS, 
1989; SISS, 1990; and SISS, 2001). Despite the introduction of these measures, SISS has been criticized 
for not being able to construct an effective database system that compiles sufficient and accurate 
information on the operators’ performances. 
 
 
Price regulation 
 
The regulations prescribed the method for calculating tariffs. These tariffs were to reflect the real costs of 
providing water and sanitation services, and were based on a model that was used to calculate the long-
term marginal costs of a simulated, efficient utility operator. In this way, the regulator would be able to 
calculate and provide incentives (Serra, 2000). 
 
The water tariffs have two main components—a fixed charge (typically 20 per cent of the water bill) that 
covers the costs associated with connection, secondary network maintenance, and billing, and a variable 
charge that covers current and capital costs, which vary in the short and long term (Alfaro, 1997).  
 
The regulations for water and sanitation service provision in Chile make great use of benchmarking, or 
the yardstick method, to compare the performances of operators. The regulator carried out tariff studies in 
order to formulate the characteristics of a model operator—a theoretical operator that provides water and 
sewerage services in an efficient manner under existing regulations. The model enabled the regulator to 
identify the operational and investment costs of an efficient operator and the tariff levels that would then 
reflect the real economic costs of an efficient operator. 
 
By establishing the characteristics (for example, the operating costs, investment costs, tariffs, etc.) of the 
model operator, the regulator could then forecast what an actual water operator would have to spend in 
the long term in order to improve the water utility to an optimum level of performance. The water 
regulator could then adjust the water tariffs to those long-term marginal costs. 
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Concurrent to its adjusting tariffs to the long-term marginal costs, the operator also receives some return 
on its investment. The regulator provides an incentive for improvements by allowing the operator to 
temporarily retain any extra gains it derives by improving efficiency. Figure 3 provides a simplified 
illustration of the tariff determination process.  
 
The regulator’s review of water tariffs is set to take place every five years, or if and when any unexpected 
changes in the contract conditions occur (for example, an increase in demand, the provision of significant 
new information, etc.). The tariff review process starts fourteen to seventeen months before the end of the 
tariff cycle. At this time, SISS and the operator meet to discuss whether the tariffs should be revised on 
the grounds of operational costs, investments, inflation or macroeconomic factors. If the private operator 
has made excess (abnormal) profits, the regulator will try to pass back some of these profits to the 
customers through a tariff reduction. If the regulator and the operator are unable to reach an agreement, 
SISS appoints a panel of experts to determine the new level.  
 
Once the tariff studies are complete, the regulator meets with the operator again to present the conclusions 
and recommendations of the experts and to again try to reach an agreement on the new tariffs. If they still 
cannot agree, an independent commission of experts will be appointed to carry out a similar study. The 
Commission’s results are binding on all parties. 
 
The initial tariffs were introduced in 1990 for a period of five years. During the second tariff review, 
which was carried out in 1995, tariffs were increased by 6 per cent and then remained constant until 1999 
(Alfaro, 1997).  
 
The process that was used in the tariff review of benchmarking using a model was without disagreement 
among the stakeholder, particularly the establishment and use of the model operator characteristics. It 
was difficult to get agreement with the private operators on what would be the cost characteristics of an 
ideal, efficient (model) operator, and this resulted in difficult negotiations with the operators. It should 
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also be noted that the regulator, SISS, has lower bargaining power and influence in Chile than the private 
companies who have greater political influence (Bitrán and Serra, 1998). 
 
 
Service quality regulation 
 
The regulations also prescribe the minimum level of services to be delivered. The regulator undertakes 
regular reviews to determine the current level of performance of the water utilities; it can then take 
appropriate action if necessary. 
 
Conditions necessary to implement regulatory mechanisms 
 
The conditions required for regulatory systems to work are accountability, independence and an adequate 
level of resources. 
 
Accountability 
 
According to the law for sanitation services (SISS, 1989), the President of Chile, through the Ministry of 
Public Infrastructure, is responsible for overseeing the water regulator’s actions. The Ministry of Public 
Infrastructure oversees the technical and financial performance of the water regulator. Any complaints on 
regulatory decisions must be reported to the Appeals Court in Santiago, where they will be investigated. 
The water regulator is notified of complaints made against it. The Court then reaches a verdict on the 
complaint and its decision is final (SISS, 1989; SISS, 1990; and SISS, 2001). 
 
 
Independence  
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The Ministry of the Economy has ultimate responsibility for approving water tariffs proposed by the 
regulator (SISS, 2001). As a result, the government could veto unpopular but justifiable tariff 
adjustments, but no evidence of this was found during the research. 
 
The General Director of SISS makes key decisions without consulting a Board of Directors. The fact that 
the water regulator is frequently unable to penalize private operators for their non-compliance with the 
agreed investment plans shows that the water regulator lacks power and independence (Berg and Corton, 
2000). 
 
 
Resources 
 
The Treasury Office (Ministerio de Hacienda) funds the water regulator (SISS, 1990). SISS presents its 
financial accounts to the Treasury Office, which agrees a new budget after reviewing them. Being 
dependent on the Treasury for funds may put pressure on the water regulator and could undermine 
regulatory independence. 
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Case 3. England and Wales 
 
Background 
 
England and Wales are part of the United Kingdom (UK), which is located in northern Europe. Together, 
England and Wales had a population of around 60 million in 1999 (UNDP, 2001 and WHO, 2000); 99 per 
cent had access to improved water resources at that time (UNDP, 2001).  
 
In the late 1980s, the British government made a decision to privatize the water sector in response to the 
perceived need to improve an aged water infrastructure. The water sector at that time required extensive 
rehabilitation and also needed to attract investment in an appropriate timeframe so that it could meet new 
quality standards  
 
Legislation to allow privatization of the water sector was introduced under the Water Act 1989. This 
allowed the privatization of water utilities, and in November 1989 ten water and sewerage companies 
were floated on the stock market. Further legislation, for example, the Water Industry Act 1991, 
Competition Act 1998, Water Industry Act 1999, and the Draft Water Bill, November 2000, was later 
introduced to strengthen and update the regulatory system to take account of new priorities. 
 
The government established the water regulator, the Director General of Water Services (DGWS), under 
the Water Act 1989 to ensure industry compliance with regulatory requirements (Ofwat, 2000b). The 
regulator, DGWS, then created Ofwat to assist. 
 
The DGWS’s main duties are presented in Box 3. 
 
Box 3: The water regulator, DGWS’s, main duties 
 
• To protect consumers from possible monopolistic behaviour. 
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• To set water tariff limits, thus restricting the revenue that companies can collect from water bills to an 
adequate amount. 
• To set up independent regional Customer Service Committees to represent customers. 
• To receive and investigate customer complaints. 
• To promote the competition in the water sector. 
• To promote the efficient use of water. 
• To supervise and update the development plans agreed with the operator in order to guarantee that 
investment commitments and expansion plans are in the best interests of both users and operators. 
• To initiate and then supervise the privatization process of publicly owned water and sewerage utilities. 
 
Source: Ofwat (2001a, 2000b)  
 
 
Regulatory mechanisms 
 
The regulatory mechanisms discussed in this chapter cover three areas of the water regulatory system in 
England and Wales: information access; price regulation; and service quality control. 
 
 
Information access 
 
Ofwat receives information from a variety of sources—the regulated water companies, other regulatory 
agencies (the Environment Agency and the Drinking Water Inspectorate), customers, independent 
specialist consultants and experts. The most important source of information is the operators themselves, 
as they provide internal information that is crucial for monitoring their performance and reviewing tariffs 
(Ofwat, 2001g). The operators are obliged to provide the water regulator with an annual report called the 
June Return Report, which includes data and information on the performance of the private operator and 
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the service standards it provides (Jouravlev, 2000). The June Return Report covers the 12-month period 
up to the end of March. It includes information on areas such as:  
• the operator’s key outputs (pressures, interruptions, sewers flooding, etc.);  
• responses to consumer queries and complaints;  
• details of the operator’s accounts (i.e. profit and loss accounts, operational costs, etc.); and 
• financial (i.e. new assets, maintenance and depreciation, expenditure, etc.), and non-financial 
information (i.e. the population supplied, new connections, size of network, water sources, etc.).  
(Jouravlev, 2000). 
 
The licensed operators (there are private operators which, due to size or internal water use, are not 
licensed or otherwise fall outside economic regulatory control) must also provide Ofwat with an Annual 
Principal Statement. This outlines the tariffs that the operator proposes to charge in the following year, 
along with the justifications for those tariffs. To avoid possible manipulation of accounts by the operator, 
the water regulator submits the operator’s information to qualified independent experts who examine it 
for quality and accuracy. The water regulator also makes any information that is not commercially 
confidential available to the public. According to one expert interviewed, the regulator has seen fit to 
categorize increasing amounts of information as non-commercially confidential; increasingly, companies 
have to argue the confidentiality case if they are to receive information protection.  
 
The water utility regulatory system in England and Wales also puts a great deal of emphasis on 
information provided by consumers. There are 10 regional Customer Service Committees (CSCs) that 
represent consumer interests and provide feedback (Ofwat, 2001e). Ofwat also established the Ofwat 
National Customer Council (ONCC), to represent and protect customers’ interests nationally and to 
advise the regulator, the DGWS, on customer interests (Ofwat, 2001b).  
 
 
Price regulation  
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Like other regulators, Ofwat sets tariffs and reviews them periodically (Ofwat, 2000b). 
 
The price regulation system in England and Wales ensures that the water companies’ pricing schemes are 
in agreement with legislation. The system also promotes competition by assessing, comparing and 
publishing information on each private operator’s performance (Ofwat, 1999, 1999a). 
 
In England and Wales, the water regulator uses the price-cap or RPI-X mechanism to regulate tariffs 
(Burns and Estache, 1999; Terence, 1999). The retail price index (X) is adjusted for expected productivity 
gains; this allows the operator to finance investment plans while remaining efficient (Klein and Irwin, 
1996). 
 
Initially, the water licenses specified that prices be reviewed every ten years, but now it happens every 
five years. Prices may also be adjusted if there is justification to do so (see Box 4).  
 
Box 4: Justifications for a price review 
 
• To transfer past efficiency gains more quickly to customers; and to build scope for future efficiency 
improvements into the price limits. 
• To create a framework where the costs of any new quality obligations can be met, if possible, without 
bills rising in real terms. 
• To develop a framework where expenditure to correct imbalances in supply and demand is largely met 
by changes in the bills of those customers whose demand is increasing, not by all customers. 
 
Source: Ofwat (1999) 
 
Tariffs can be reviewed earlier if there are major changes. Recently, Ofwat proposed to include in the 
water licenses any new circumstances under which an extra tariff review could be carried out (Ofwat, 
2001f). These circumstances are: 
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• if the private operator suffers adverse effects that could not have been avoided by careful 
management; or 
• if the operator enjoys favourable effects that are not attributable to careful, prudent management; and 
• if either of these change results in a variation of 20 per cent in the company’s turnover. 
 
A simplified illustration of the method used for the 1999 price review is provided in Figure 2 . 
 
The first tariff review carried out in 1994 was criticized on the grounds that Ofwat underestimated the 
private operators’ ability to reduce costs and then set price limits that allowed the water companies to 
make high profits (Green, 1997). As a result, the regulator decided, or was politically pressured, to lower 
price limits in the 1999 price review. The robustness of the regulatory mechanisms has also been called 
into question on the grounds that it fails to establish a proper mechanism for evaluating the water 
companies’ efficiency. According to Ofwat (2001j), the capital expenditure of private operators for the 
year 2000–01 was 20 per cent lower (£700 million) than expected. Operators may have talked up their 
plans for investment so as to ensure higher water prices (PSIRU, 2001). 
 
 
Service quality control 
 
The regulatory system in England and Wales prioritizes service quality and has introduced several 
mechanisms, such as the Guarantee Standards Scheme (GSS), the June Return and the Customer Service 
Committees (CSCs), to monitor service quality standards and obtain redress for poor service. The 
regulator not only monitors each company’s performance in terms of the service it delivers to customers, 
but also compares the performance of all the operators in the water sector to establish a minimum level of 
service quality that customers are entitled to expect (Ofwat, 2001i). 
 
According to Ofwat (2001c), quality of service has gradually improved in some areas since PSP was 
introduced (see Box 5). 
 25
 
Box 5: Service quality improvement figures since PSP 
 
 
• More than 99 per cent of billing queries were replied to within five working days. 
• There has been a 10 per cent decrease in written complaints. 
• More than 350,000 households have been metered. 
• Eight companies answered more than 95 per cent of telephone calls within 30 seconds; 11 companies 
answered more than 90 per cent of calls within 30 seconds. 
• There has been a 13 per cent decrease in properties with inadequate water pressure. 
• 98.83 per cent of water quality tests met the required standards in 2000 (an increase of 0.01 per cent 
from 1999). 
• There has been a slight decrease in properties at risk of flooding because of overloaded sewers. 
• There has been an increase of customer compensation values under the GSS. 
 
Source: Ofwat (2001c) 
 
The regulation of service quality encompasses standards such as the reliability of services and replying to 
customer complaints, and inputs from the Drinking Water Inspectorate (i.e. regulation of water quality 
standards) and the Environment Agency (i.e. regulation of environmental standards). In cases of non-
compliance by the private operators, the appropriate regulator takes action such as enforcing 
compensation payments and refunds, prosecuting the operator in question and/or enforcing service 
improvement measures. 
 
Guaranteed Standards Scheme (GSS) 
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The Guaranteed Standards Scheme (GSS) is a customer compensation system that was introduced in 1989 
to set standards of compensation in cases where operators fail to meet minimum standards (Ofwat, 
2001h). The GSS does not preclude customers taking legal action against the private operator. It has been 
recently reviewed and updated. 
 
June Return Report 
 
The June Return Report is an important source of information on each water company’s performance. It 
contains details of the services it has delivered to customers and is therefore a useful tool that the 
regulator can use to monitor minimum service quality standards. 
 
Customer Service Committees  
 
Customer Service Committees (CSCs) are local, independent water ‘watchdogs’ that represent customers 
in each region. CSCs were introduced as part of the Water Act of 1989. They investigate customer 
complaints and make the Director General of Ofwat aware of customers’ concerns, including those that 
are about service quality (Ofwat, 2001e).  
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Conditions for implementing regulatory mechanisms 
 
This section investigates whether conditions such as accountability, independence and adequate resources 
are present in the regulatory system. 
  
Regulatory accountability 
 
The water regulation system in England and Wales places considerable importance on setting 
mechanisms that guarantee that the water regulator is accountable for its decisions, and at the same time 
that operators and consumers are given an effective system to appeal against the regulator’s decisions. 
There are three main institutions overseeing the regulator: the Competition Commission; Select 
Committees; and the Courts. The Minister responsible for the water sector has the power to overrule any 
decision taken by the regulator and is able to stop any license amendments, but these powers have never 
been used (Green, 1999). 
 
Competition Commission 
 
The Competition Commission took over from the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in April 1999. It 
is composed of around thirty part-time members with expertise in fields such as law and business, along 
with full-time civil servants. The Competition Commission investigates license amendments or proposals. 
If there is disagreement between the operators and regulator, the Competition Commission looks at the 
evidence; the Commission’s decision in relation to license amendments is final.  
 
Select Committee 
 
The Select Committee is composed of 10 Members of Parliament, with political party representation 
proportional to the number of seats that party holds in the House of Commons. No member of the Cabinet 
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or Shadow Cabinet can be a member of a Select Committee. The Committee is entitled to appoint expert 
advisers on any particular issue that it is investigating. 
 
Unlike the Competition Commission, the Select Committee can initiate its own enquiries. Its 
recommendations are not binding on the regulator or the private operators, but are very influential on the 
public. 
 
Courts 
 
Under the Water Act of 1991, individuals or companies have the right to present to court a complaint on 
decisions taken by the government or any government department, and this includes the water regulator. 
The investigation process carried out by the court is called a judicial review. It will not normally 
investigate the substance of a regulatory decision, but rather whether or not the procedure that was 
followed in order to arrive at a particular decision met with minimum standards. According to Green 
(1999), the only time that the judicial review will overrule a regulatory decision on a substantial matter is 
if that decision breaches the law. 
 
 
Independence  
 
It is difficult to design a regulatory system that is totally independent of political influence. Nonetheless, 
the research carried out for this report did not encounter any serious instances where the England and 
Wales water regulatory system lacked independence or where political influences affected its decision-
making processes. 
 
 
Resources 
 
 29
Ofwat’s funding comes from operating fees that the private operating companies have to pay (Ofwat, 
2001c). Ofwat’s operating costs are represented in Table 3 and show an increase of £5.9 million since 
1990 (Home Treasury, 2001). This increase can be explained by a corresponding increase in Ofwat’s 
staff, which has risen by 115 employees since 1990. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Main regulatory problems identified by experts 
Following their analysis of the three case studies, complemented by their interviews with the panel of 
experts (their opinions were not restricted to the case studies presented), the authors were able to identify 
a number of generic areas of improvements in the regulatory systems. These included:  
 
• information asymmetries due to poor database and information access; 
• lack of credibility with potential private operators; 
• lack of true independence; 
• lack of technical capacity; 
• lack of independence from government ministries and the regulated industry itself; 
• lack of experience and resources; and 
• an inefficient industry structure. 
 
Theory and practice 
It is one thing to design an efficient regulatory mechanism, but a very different exercise to actually 
implement that mechanism. If regulation is to work effectively, there needs to be a culture of co-operation 
and partnership, one that respects the spirit of the agreement. Adherence to the contract entirely on a basis 
of enforcement is a very costly option. 
 
Costs and benefits 
There is a cost to any benefit. The cost of regulation has to be weighed against the benefits accrued from 
that regulation. If regulation is to be effective and efficient, governments need to develop agreed 
monitoring indicators and mechanisms—not only to monitor costs and benefits, but also to act swiftly on 
emerging problem areas. 
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Capacities  
The degree of sophistication of the system should reflect the capacity or the potential capacities on the 
ground. There is a tendency for governments to develop ‘ideal’ mechanisms, which either do not work or 
become very expensive to implement. In addition, those governments that initiate PSP are often unable or 
unwilling to provide the resources necessary to implement sophisticated regulatory mechanisms.  
 
Managing change 
In any country, it is unlikely that the conditions under which the PSP agreements have to operate will 
remain fixed. A government who decides to privatize its water and sanitation sector should realize that 
there is always a degree of uncertainly. The need to deal with that risk should be the basis of the change 
management strategy within its regulatory mechanism. There may be a case for more frequent review 
periods in the regulatory systems. 
 
Perception management  
Many customers perceive any increase in tariffs as a means by which the private sector is increasing its 
profits. In some cases that may be true, but in others different levels of service are being provided. Where 
this is the case, it unrealistic and unjustified to compare current tariffs with those charged by the public 
sector before privatization, because at those prices provision was not sustainable. Unfortunately, tariff 
reviews rarely allow users to associate an increase in tariffs with an increase in quality. Users are 
generally willing to pay for better services provided that they are able and/or have the choice to do so.  
 
Information dissemination: accountability and transparency to the users 
Users need to be informed about the activities of both the private sector and the regulator if the system of 
regulation is going to develop public credibility. Customers also need a quick, cheap and simple system 
through which they can complain about inadequate services. Expecting people to resort to the courts will 
be unpopular; such processes can be lengthy, complicated and expensive. From the beginning, customers 
should be given information about the level of service they can expect and what to do if they do not get it. 
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Client satisfaction 
Just like in any other business, client satisfaction is crucial. Identifying what drives satisfaction and 
developing indicators to monitor and improve satisfaction levels is crucial for the success of PPP and its 
regulation. 
 
Politics  
And why not? It is perfectly legitimate to build public benefits into a PPP agreement and enforce these by 
regulations that are supported by political will and governance tools. However, political interference in 
the process for the benefit of a few in the short term is needs to be avoided. One way to avoid such 
political interference is to make the political instruments that are part of the regulatory process completely 
transparent, so that users are aware of what politicians are up to. 
 
Regulatory Culture 
The role of regulator as an outsider or ‘whistle blower’ has its limitations. It is expensive and the 
regulator does not have the muscle to show the ‘red card’. There is a need for governments to re-engineer 
the regulator’s role so that it is more like a partner, urging and sometime forcing the parties to behave in a 
manner that produces a win–win situation. This new role should take into account the specific political, 
social and economic factors and the available and potential resources on the ground. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Aguas Argentinas S.A capital stock ownership 
Investor Stock ownership (%) 
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 34.73 
Aguas de Barcelona 25.01 
Employee stock ownership plan (PPP) 10 
Banco de Galicia 8.26 
Vivendi 7.55 
Aguas Inversora 5.2 
International Finance Corporation 5 
Anglian Water 4.25 
Source: http://www.aguasargentinas.com.ar 
 
 
Table 2: Public opinion of the Buenos Aires water concession 
Pre-privatization Post-privatization 
Opinion 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Positive 25.5 59.4 38.3 39.0 26.4 36.4 29.9 24.3 16.7 18.1 
Neutral  20.6 15.9 24.4 26.5 25.0 25.6 29.2 31.6 27.7 26.9 
Negative 38.6 16.4 34.4 29.3 43.6 33.3 36.2 42.7 52.2 51.9 
No opinion 15.4 8.4 3.0 5.3 5.0 4.7 4.7 1.4 3.4 3.1 
Source: Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoría. 
 
Table 3.  Ofwat’s operation costs and numbers of staff 
Year Operating costs (£ million) Number of staff 
1990-91 4.0 112 
1991-92 5.3 132 
1992-93 5.7 140 
1993-94 8.1 156 
1994-95 9.1 179 
1995-96 8.9 194 
1996-97 9.3 190 
1997-98 10.4 209 
1998-99 9.7 234 
1999-00 10.9 226 
2000-01 10.9 227 
Source: Home Treasury (2001) 
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Figure 1: Simplified illustration of the tariff determination process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SISS (2001) 
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Figure 2: Methodology for the 1999 tariff review  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: Ofwat (1999) 
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